Climate Justice, Ethics and Equity in the Republic of Peru’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) Submission

November 2015

Beth Jean Evans

PhD Candidate, University of Toronto, Department of Political Science and School for the Environment

 

This paper responds to the research questions of the Project on Deepening National Responses to Climate Change On The Basis of Ethics and Justice, a joint project of the University of Auckland, School of Architecture and Planning and Widener University, School of Law, Environmental Law Center. The research questions and responses are as follows:

1. Identify the most recent national commitment on reducing ghg emissions (INDCs) made by the country and the date on which it was made.

On September 28^th, 2015 the Government of Peru submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) document to the UNFCCC, in which they committed to a reduction of emissions equivalent to 30% below the projected business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2030 (Republic of Peru 2015). Of these planned reductions, 20% are unconditional which means that they will occur through “domestic investment and expenses”, while the remaining 10% are conditional upon the availability of international financing and the “existence of favourable conditions” (2). The government acknowledges, however, “significant room for upgrading the INDC on subsequent review phases” (6). The Peruvian INDC also outlines a number of adaptation measures, focusing on the sectors and systems that are seen as particularly vulnerable to climate change: water, agriculture, fishery, forestry and health (9).

 

Although Peru does not go into much detail about the particularities of their mitigation actions in the INDC document itself, they build upon the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) that Peru has been developing since 2010 and which are reflected in Peru’s National Strategy on Climate Change. These actions are aimed at achieving a zero deforestation rate by 2021, 33% renewable energy profile by 2020, and the design and implementation of measures to reduce emissions from solid waste management (Carmelo & Del Biondo 2015; MINAM 2014a; GIZ 2012; Piu & Garcia 2011). Some have calculated that approximately 70% of the mitigation efforts Peru has committed to are therefore likely to be achieved in the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector, while the remaining 30% will come from emission reductions in energy, transport, industrial, and waste sectors (Climate Action Tracker 2015; Carranza 2015).

 

2. Given that any national ghg emissions reduction target is implicitly a position on an atmospheric ghg concentration that will avoid dangerous climate change, to what extent has the nation expressly identified an atmospheric ghg level target goal or a warming limit that its INDC is designed to achieve and is it possible to quantitatively examine how the ghg emission target links quantitatively to an atmospheric ghg concentration or carbon budget?

Peru clearly states that it has “defined its mitigation commitment in order to participate in the collective effort to keep global warming below the 1.5 C° – 2.0 C°” (11). However, they offer no way to quantitatively measure or assess whether and how their stated contributions relate to this goal or how they have determined what their ‘fair share’ of mitigation responsibility to be, stating only that the 1.5 C° – 2.0 C° target is to be “met through the efforts of all countries in accordance to science and the principles of differentiated equity”, although they do not elaborate upon what kind of differentiation would be considered an equitable one (12). Although Peru states that its intended actions are “fair and ambitious” (6), some analysts have claimed that Peru’s commitments are not in line with a 2 C° maximum temperature increase unless other countries make “much deeper reductions and comparably greater effort” (Climate Action Tracker 2015). Refuting such claims would require that Peru explain more specifically how they have determined their GHG reduction target vis-à-vis the stated goal of a maximum1.5 C° – 2.0 C° temperature increase.

3. Given that any national ghg emissions reduction target is implicitly a position on what ethics, justice and equity requires of it, to what extent has the nation expressly identified the justice or equity basis that it has considered in determining a ghg emissions reduction target percentage level?

Although Peru does not explicitly identify a particular ethical basis for their intended contributions, some implicit notions of justice and equity can be identified. At the most basic level, Peru has recognized that they have a certain amount of responsibility with respect to climate change, stating that Peru is “responsible for its actions” (2) and, elsewhere, that Peru is a “climatically responsible country, at the national level” (MINAM 2014b, 5, author’s translation). Peru expands slightly upon these vague notions of responsibility in the INDC by committing to “increase the promotion, development and implementation” of mitigation and adaptation actions in order to “meet the ethical responsibilities at the national and international levels” (1). Although this seems to imply that Peru recognizes an ethical responsibility both to its own people as well as globally, the ethical determinants of this responsibility (why it exists, what is consists of, and to whom specifically it applies) are not made explicit, and there are no other explicit references made to ethical concepts or framings in the INDC. There have been indications that Peru’s climate change policy is driven, in part, by ethical principles concerning the duty to meet commitments derived from international treaties and agreements (MINAM 2015a, 106); however, this emphasis is perhaps unsurprising, given Peru’s role as host of the 2014 COP and continuing presidency of the UNFCCC and the undeniable impact that has on both the framing and content of Peru’s own domestic commitments.

Language of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (and related discussions of what that concept implies or requires of a country) that is a veritable staple amongst developing country submissions is also largely absent from Peru’s INDC, which calls only for “the efforts of all countries in accordance to science and the principles of differentiated equity [CBDR]” (12). They do not, however, expand upon what ‘differentiated equity’ means for Peru and how it relates to their commitments and/or what they expect of others. A 2014 interview with Environmental Minister Manuel Pulgar-Vidal however clearly suggests that, for Peru, the standing principle of CBDR does not mean, “any country should be exonerated from fulfilling its duties” (quoted in Portillo 2015), suggesting again that Peru acknowledges a certain amount of ethical responsibility to address climate change, despite their position as an non-Annex I (developing country) party to the UNFCCC.

 

That is not to say that Peru denies that there are differing level of responsibility to address climate change between developed and developing countries, and that developing countries will need assistance in order to achieve or deepen their mitigation and adaptation goals (recall that 10% of Peru’s intended 30% reductions are ‘conditional’ upon the availability of international financing and the “existence of favourable conditions” at the international level). However, unlike other developing countries with similar conditionality clauses in their INDCs, Peru does not draw upon ethical or justice-based justifications such as historical or climate debt in order to demand assistance from developed countries. Also unlike other developing countries, Peru refrains from referencing as a initial caveat in their INDC submission UNFCCC Article 4.7, which states that “…economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country parties” and that any actions taken by developing countries will depend upon the commitments and assistance of developed countries. Rather, Peru chooses to refer at the outset of its commitments to the ‘two pillars’ under which COP20 in Lima was conducted, which were ‘urgency’ and ‘high level of ambition’ (1).

 

Generally speaking then, the Peruvian INDC and related climate policy documents focus heavily on the ‘what’ of climate change action, with very little emphasis on the ‘why’ beyond a few somewhat vague references to ‘responsibility’. However, given Peru’s unique role vis-à-vis the UNFCCC process and the international spotlighting of their INDCs as a result, their tendency towards use of an optimistic, win-win discourse in lieu of more polemical framings such as historical responsibility and climate/adaptation debt is perhaps not surprising.

 

4. To what extent, if any, has the national debate about the nation’s INDC considered or acknowledged that the nation not only has economic interests in setting its ghg target but also ethical obligations to those who are most vulnerable to climate change?

Peru is quite emphatic about the economic opportunities associated with reducing greenhouse gas emissions and the potential synergies between climate action and sustainable growth and development within Peru. While other developing countries tend to imply a significant economic trade-off between climate mitigation and domestic development priorities, Peru emphasizes that they have experienced significant economic growth as of late, “while complying with the country’s international commitments and domestic action necessary to face the conditions imposed by Climate change” (Article 1). This emphasis on economic opportunity is a much more dominant framing throughout Peru’s INDC submission than is any emphasis on ethics or responsibility.

Peru also makes it clear though that they are considered “particularly vulnerable” to the impacts of climate change, according to the UNFCCC’s nine characteristics of vulnerability (7). They also mention their low levels of historical and current emissions (estimated at 0.3% of global total as of 2010), as well as their relatively low per capita emission levels in comparison to both the Latin American Region and the world (ibid). Despite their high vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and relatively low historical and per capita contributions to global GHG concentrations, Peru does not focus exclusively on the ethical responsibilities developed countries have to Peru given these facts. They also do not explicitly acknowledge any ethical responsibility towards other, poorer countries or peoples, beyond vague references to ‘national and international ethical commitments’ (1). Rather, Peru seems to imply that the ethical responsibility of the Peruvian government is to its own people, all of whom are exposed to the impacts of climate change, but with a particular focus on those segments and sectors of the population that are most acutely vulnerable (9). Thus, states that it will prioritize adaptation to climate change along as well as addressing poverty and inequality at the national level, but that these efforts will necessarily be accompanied by a “significant reduction of GHG emissions” (6; MINAM 2014a, 39).

5. To what extent have NGOs or other major participants engaged in climate change policy formation at the national level examined the national INDC from an ethics, justice, or equity perspective?

Although there has been some emphasis on the importance of procedural equity in the formation of the INDCs and related climate policies (Derecho Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (DAR) 2015), civil society actors engaged in climate change policy formation in Peru have for the most part not drawn explicitly on ethical discourses when evaluating the commitments made in the INDC and related policy documents. In fact, the particular content of the INDC submission itself has not been a matter of much analysis, with Civil Society focusing more so on the closely related National Strategy on Climate Change (MINAM 2014a), which goes into much more detail (and therefore offers much more opportunity for controversy) about the operational details of Peru’s climate policy than does the INDC submission itself. For example, although some major civil society groups interested in climate policy have critiqued the National Strategy for Climate Change for lacking ambition (particularly given Peru’s COP presidency), lacking specificity, and insufficient consideration of cross-sectoral policy implications (Carmelo & Del Biondo 2015; Grupo Perú COP 2015), these critiques are framed in largely pragmatic terms rather than employing ethical or justice-based framings or critiques. However, according to a leading Peruvian climate NGO – Movimiento Ciudadano frente al Cambio Climático – a number of Peruvian organizations will be taking to the streets in November of 2015 as part of the World Climate March to demand a “just” climate agreement in Paris (MOCICC 2015). This suggests the existence of an underlying concern with climate justice within certain sectors civil society, even if these concerns have not yet been prominent in their critiques of Peru’s climate policies to date.

Perhaps the only actor that has notably taken issue with the deeper principles of equity and justice on which Peru’s climate policy is based has been national indigenous organizations (primarily AIDESEP). In various forums relating to climate policy – in particular that involving forest and other land-use issues – indigenous groups have been very vocal in opposing market mechanisms that mercantilize’ and attempt to sell nature (considered sacred to Peruvian indigenous groups). They also more specifically the generation of carbon offsets (particularly those from avoided deforestation projects) that let developed countries ‘off the hook’ for their climate debt while failing to recognize and compensate the indigenous communities who have historically cared for and maintained the services of forests and other ecosystems. Finally, they call upon the government to adhere to its international obligations to respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including recognition of ‘historical debt’ in recognizing indigenous lands (AIDESEP 2011). There is currently no publically available documentation suggesting that indigenous organizations have evaluated the final, submitted INDC in terms of its adherence to their ethical principles; however, one would assume that these concerns were raised during the public consultations phase for the draft INDC document in which indigenous groups took part (see answer to Question #8).

6. To what extent has the national media covered issues concerning the national INDC with respect to ethical, justice, and equity issues?

National media coverage of the INDC specifically has been somewhat limited, while national media coverage of Peru’s climate policy in general has tended to overwhelmingly reflect the trends outlined above concerning civil society responses (concerns about participatory inclusion and concerns on recent passing of somewhat contradictory policies for mining, etc.).

7. Before any nation may adopt an INDC or climate policy it often has to satisfy national economic interests. Yet many nations fail to disclose the national economic interests that have actually affected the lack of aggressiveness of the national INDC when commitments are made under the UNFCCC. Given this, what is known about the actual basis for the aggressiveness of the national INDC?

Peru goes to great lengths in their INDC submission to highlight the perceived economic advantages of taking action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Peru emphasizes that any domestic climate action will be done in conjunction with “maintaining a highly competitive economy” (3) which is “in line with the new global trends” (1) towards decarbonization and green growth, suggesting that addressing climate change is complementary to, rather than in conflict with, domestic economic growth and development. In related policy documents, Peru further elaborates this synergistic relationship between domestic economic development and action on climate change by stating that addressing climate change is a prerequisite to sustainable development within the Peru (MINAM 2014a, 32) that will allow them to “maximise the social and environmental benefits of efficient and inclusive productive sectors” which is the result of sustainable use of natural resources (1). Given the perceived low costs and potentially high social and economic benefits of reducing emissions for a country with Peru’s developmental profile and GHG emission composition, Peru therefore claims that they are fortunate to be in a position to “correct the curve” of emissions growth without affecting economic growth and environmental and social sustainability that must accompany it (MINAM 2014a, 24).

Despite the dominant rhetoric about synergies, some have suggested that the government’s ambition has been stifled as a result of pressures from certain ‘sectors’ with economic interests in reducing the government’s emission reduction goal (although it is not clear which sectors in particular this refers to) (Grupo Perú COP 2015). Others have accused the government of using lofty rhetoric concerning the environment in public forums (particularly as it relates to climate change), while continuing to support environmentally damaging but politically powerful extractivist sectors within Peru (Carmelo & Del Biondo, 2015; “Open letter to Peru” 2014; Yeo 2014). Most notably, civil society groups have drawn attention to the government’s recent approval of an economic reform package that weakens environmental protections and standards in order to promote private investment in the wake of the recent economic downturn, suggesting that the government does see some trade-offs between environmental protectionism and economic growth (Carmelo & Del Biondo, 2015; Edwards et al. 2015; 2015). Although these developments have not been linked directly to the level of climate ambition indicated in Peru’s INDC submission, actions taken to encourage or facilitate investment in sectors such as mining, agriculture and forestry are bound to conflict with, or at least constrain, Peru’s performance in climate mitigation and adaptation and therefore will undoubtedly impact Peru’s climate actual achievements, even if they have not directly or obviously limited their stated aspirations.

8. What formal mechanisms are available in the nation for citizens, NGOs and other interested organizations to question/contest the nation’s ethical position on climate change?

Several formal mechanisms have been developed in Peru over the past decade to facilitate the participation of societal actors in the formation of climate policy, although whether actors have been able to challenge the government’s ethical position (and how successful those challenges have been) is somewhat unclear. Prima facie, the participatory mechanisms for climate policy in Peru are made to seem fairly extensive; for example, the government ran several workshops for the formation of the general Environmental Agenda – which includes provisions relevant for climate change policy – through national-level workshops as well as a month-long consultative process with regional governments (MINAM 2015a, 100). There is also a National Climate Change Commission, established in 1993 and modified in 2009 and 2013, with the goal of involving various sectors (public and private) in the elaboration and implementation of climate change polices within Peru (MINAM 2014a, 34).

 

In a document outlining Peru’s position in the lead-up to COP21 the government claims that Peru’s climate change policy is constructed through a ‘constant and transparent dialogue’ with an openness to listening to the inputs of all relevant actors, consisting of three periods of workshops, forums, and debates (see MINAM 2015b). An initial draft of the INDC specifically seems to have undergone a lengthy process of public consultation in the months leading up to its submission (June 5^th to July 17^th, 2015), which included input from national and sub-national governmental entities, as well as civil society representatives and indigenous organizations; however, the government claims that the general content of the INDC under review during this phase was the result of an input process beginning in 2003 that has involved over 100 political and technical meetings incorporating the voices of over 300 experts (1).

 

There have been some critiques about both the inclusiveness of these processes, as well as the extent to which the government actually incorporates the inputs of various groups, particularly those critical of the government position (see AIDESEP 2013 for an example relating to reducing emissions from avoided deforestation [REDD] policy). It is also unclear whether and how actors involved in these processes were willing or able to challenge the ethical basis of the government’s climate policy specifically; however, given the relative absence of ethical framings or justifications in the INDC submission itself, and the fact that civil society analysis/media coverage of the INDC and related policies have not employed ethical or justice-based lenses when examining the commitments contained therein, one might reasonably assume that ethical issues did not feature heavily in these discussions.

One exception to this may be the successes indigenous groups have had influencing certain aspects of Peru’s climate policy, particularly with respect to the proposed reducing emissions from avoided deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) mechanism. Recognizing that the majority of forested lands in Peru are located in indigenous territories and therefore that indigenous approval of, and participation in, policies to mitigate GHG emissions from deforestation is critical, the Peruvian government has established several forums in recent years in which indigenous groups have been able to influence both the ethical and technical content of Peru’s response to REDD. Compared to the pragmatic and technocratic language used by Peru in many of its climate policy documents, indigenous groups in Peru have been much more emphatic concerning issues of climate justice and historical debt. Most notably, they have vocally opposed market mechanisms that ‘mercantilize’ and attempt to sell nature (considered sacred to Peruvian indigenous groups) in order to generate offsets that let developed countries ‘off the hook’ for their climate debt while failing to recognize and compensate the indigenous communities who have historically cared for and maintained the services of forests and other ecosystems. Indigenous groups also have called used forest-related climate policy forums in particular to pressure the government to adhere to its international obligations to respect the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including recognition of ‘historical debt’ in recognizing indigenous lands (AIDESEP 2011).

These ethical concerns have been recognized and incorporated by the government into climate policy in certain ways (e.g. formal recognition of the non-market based ‘Indigenous REDD’ proposal in domestic policy documents, allocation of REDD funds for the titling of indigenous lands) (Forest People’s Program 2011; Rights and Resources 2013). This suggests a certain openness of the government towards calls for the incorporation of alternative or additional ethical considerations into climate policy decisions. That being said, the ethical and ideological framings employed by indigenous groups have not been overly present in the government’s INDC or related domestic policy documents, and the policies that flow from those ethics have only been partially incorporated. For example, the government does emphasize the particularly vulnerability of indigenous peoples within Peru and indicates an intention to prioritize them for adaptation activities outlined in the INDC; however, they also state support for a REDD mechanism (without mention of the indigenous variant) and admit that Peru is “considering selling emission reductions” (6), which, given Peru’s intended emission reduction profile, are likely to come primarily from forest-related mitigation activities. Thus, although formal mechanisms exist through which indigenous groups have been able to bring government’s ethical position more closely in line with the indigenous perspective, there seems to be reluctance on the behalf of the government to allow the ethical discourse and justifications used by indigenous groups to creep into their international policy statements and submissions. However, as mentioned in Question #3, Peru’s COP presidency and the particular type of diplomacy that such a role entails may have played a role in the choice of discourse employed.

9. Are you aware of any regional, state, provincial, or local governments in your country that has acknowledged ethical responsibility for climate change? If so, what have they said?

As the entities responsible for elaboration and implementation of environmental policy within Peru, 12 regional governments within Peru have laid out Regional climate change strategies, while 23 others have formed Regional CC Technical Working Groups (as of July 2014) (MINAM 2014a, 34). However, there is no evidence that any of these sub-national efforts were inspired or justified in terms of an ethical responsibility for climate change.

10. Has your national government taken any position on or otherwise encouraged individuals, businesses, organizations, subnational governments, or other entities that they have an ethical duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

The Government of Peru has stated that, “all people and institutions’ must be self-reflective of their resource use, thus suggesting that one dimension of their climate change approach is to “introduce a new dimension of responsibility and action” (p.6). They also state that the participation of the national and international private sectors will enable Peru to meet its emission reduction objectives (5) and call for higher level of involvement of cities in local/regional environmental policy decisions, including climate change (MINAM 2014a, 15). However, the government does not employ ethical or justice based discourses when making such statements, focusing instead on pragmatic considerations such as the need to reduce vulnerability and capitalise upon economic opportunity.

 

11. What recommendations would you make to get the nation or civil society in the country to take ethics and justice issues seriously in climate change policy formulation?

Unlike some of its regional counter-parts that emphasize issues of historical responsibility, international inequality, and climate/adaptation debt when positioning themselves vis-à-vis Annex-I countries, Peru has tended to focus on matters of equity and justice within the country while maintaining an optimistic and fairly inoffensive discourse concerning its role in the broader process of climate governance. Thus, Peru’s policy statements tend to focus on the government’s responsibility towards its own people (given their high levels of vulnerability to climate change) as well as the economic opportunities associated with certain mitigation and adaptation options.

 

Generally speaking then, Peru has chosen not to incorporate explicitly ethical and justice-based discourses into its climate change policy documents; however, that does not mean that their national commitments are inconsistent with what ethics and justice would demand of the country. Whether and how ethics and justice have been taken into consideration when formulating policies is at times a separate issue from the words chosen to present and justify those policies. Peru’s role as the host of the 2014 COP and continuing presidency likely impacted their ability or desire to use certain framings such as climate or adaptation debt, historical responsibility, and loss and compensation for damages, as these may have proven too polemical for a country whose mandate as President of the COP was to encourage cooperation and conciliation.

 

Although Peru may be more willing to engage with ethical calculations and justifications once their COP presidency is over, given concerns about the government’s prioritization of economic (read: extractivist) development over environmental protectionism, civil society groups may want to capitalize on the moral authority of ethics-based rhetoric (including magnifying the ‘domestic responsibility’ approach that Peru has itself used to justify its position) to ensure not only that commitments are met, but also that they are worthy of meeting. Although they are not perfect, solid mechanisms for civil society participation exist within Peru that give societal actors relatively good access to decision-makers; however, civil society still needs to take more seriously the utility of ethics-based policy analysis and the efficacy of ethical and justice-based discourse. If the Government of Peru’s commitments were to become more closely linked with an ethical position, this may increase their accountability to their own people moving forward while at the same time strengthening an international discourse that could inspire, if not require, more ambitious commitments on the behalf of industrialized nations.

 

 

 

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